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Rationing Health Care: It's a Matter of the Health
Care System's Structure
David Orentlicher, MD, JD*
I. INTRODUCTION
As policy experts have long recognized, rationing of health care is
inevitable.1 Not even the wealthiest society can provide every medical
treatment that might provide some benefit to some patients. Indeed, even
though the United States spends far more on health care than any other
country, more than 45 million Americans lack health care coverage and
therefore access to even a minimally decent level of medical care. 2 Nor
should a society try to provide any and all treatments that would provide
some benefit. Countries face competing demands for their resources, and
dollars spent on marginally-beneficial health care might yield greater
benefits when spent on education, economic development, or housing.3
Although the need for rationing may be clear, it is far less obvious how a
society should allocate its limited health care dollars. Should priority go to
" David Orentlicher is a Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Hall
Center for Law and Health at Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. Dr.
Orentlicher earned his medical degree from Harvard Medical School and his juris doctor
from Harvard Law School.
1. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan. 13,
1994, at 20, 22. See also Liner Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REv.
1449, 1459-61 (1994). See generally H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Toward Multiple Standards
of Health Care Delivery: Taking Moral and Economic Diversity Seriously, ETHICAL ISSUES
IN HEALTH CARE ON THE FRONTIERS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25, 25-29 (Stephen
Wear et al. eds., 2000).
2. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 1 (2009),
http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-05.pdf; Dianne Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller,
The Consequences of Uninsurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the Nation,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 397, 398-99 (2004). To be sure, uninsured persons do receive some
care, whether in emergency departments and community health centers or as inpatients in
hospitals. However, individuals without health care insurance die sooner and live with a
diminished quality of health than individuals who carry health care coverage.
3. Dan W. Brock, Health Care Resource Prioritization and Rationing: Why Is It So
Difficult?, 74 Soc. RESEARCH 125, 132-33 (2007). See also Daniel Callahan, What Is the
Reasonable Demand on Health Care Resources: Designing a Basic Package of Benefits, 8 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (1992) (observing that the United States spends twice as
much on health care as on education).
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the sickest patients, or should it go to the patients who would derive the
most benefit from treatment? 4 To what extent should we rely on the free
market to allocate health care (as we do, say, with automobiles), and to
what extent should the government guarantee some level of access for
people who are too poor to afford necessary care?
In trying to answer these questions, scholars have framed the debate with
three key and overlapping questions:
1. Which considerations should be used in giving some patients a higher
priority when health care resources are allocated? Should access to care be
determined by one's ability to benefit from care, the degree of one's need
for care, the urgency of one's need, or other considerations? 5 Not only is it
not obvious which criteria are more important, but they often yield
conflicting results. We might want to give care to the sickest patients, on
the ground that they have the greatest need for care. But often the sickest
patients will gain far less benefit from treatment than patients who are
healthier. Sometimes' it is too late to heal a patient whose body has been
ravaged by illness. With cancer, for example, treating the patient at an early
stage is much more likely to provide a long-term remission of the cancer
than treating a patient whose cancer has spread throughout the body (i.e.,
someone with metastatic cancer). 6
2. Who should make the rationing decisions?7 Should we rely on a
governmental agency, the insurance companies that pay medical bills,
treating physicians, or others? Do we want a national commission that can
establish uniform rules and ensure consistency from patient to patient, or do
we want physicians to make more individualized decisions that can take
into account the different circumstances of different patients?
3. How do we ensure that those responsible for implementing rationing
decisions carry out their duty to limit health care spending? Should
physicians be asked to follow formal practice guidelines that incorporate the
settled-upon rationing criteria, should the number of hospital beds be
reduced to discourage unnecessary hospitalizations, should financial
incentives be used to reward physicians and hospitals for appropriate, cost-
4. Sometimes the sickest patients will gain the most benefit from treatment, but not
always. See, infra, at text accompanying note 6.
5. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Ethical Considerations in the Allocation of
Organs and Other Scarce Medical Resources Among Patients, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 29, 30 (1995).
6. See Cancer.org, How is Colorectal Cancer Staged?, http://www.cancer.org/
docroot/cri/content/cri 2 4 3x how is colon and rectumcancer_staged.asp (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010). For someone with localized, stage I colon cancer, treatment provides a 93
percent chance of surviving for at least five years. Id. For someone with metastatic, stage IV
colon cancer, the chance of surviving for at least five years is only 8 percent. Id.
7. See generally Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
693 (1994).
[Vol. 19
Rationing Health Care
conscious care?
In answering all of these questions, writers have advocated two
important models-a centralized model in which a commission establishes
rationing guidelines for widespread use, and a decentralized model in which
rationing decisions are made by health care providers on a case-by-case
basis. 8 This article takes the view that effective rationing policy will depend
on a combination of centrally-determined policy and decentralized decision
making. Rationing can be best implemented with a centrally-established
structure that delegates rationing decisions to physicians but channels those
decisions in a cost-effective manner.
II. THE CENTRALIZED MODEL
Under the centralized model, rationing policy is shaped by a single
commission or other designated body.9 The central commission develops
uniform rationing guidelines that can be implemented by health care
providers as they take care of patients.10 Important examples of such
commissions include the Oregon Health Services Commission, the United
Network for Organ Sharing, and the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence in the United Kingdom.
The Oregon Health Services Commission was created by the Oregon
legislature in 1989 to implement the Oregon Health Plan, a policy designed
to increase coverage to indigent residents of the state. Rather than provide
generous health care coverage to some of the uninsured poor, Oregon
decided to provide good but more limited coverage to many more of the
uninsured poor.11 The Health Services Commission ranks medical
treatments in terms of their benefits, 12 the state legislature determines a
budget for the Plan every two years, and the state funds as many treatments
as it can afford, with priority given to the treatments with a more favorable
benefit-cost ratio.' 3 Thus, a single state commission decides how the Health
Plan's budget will be allocated among different medical treatments.
The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) establishes national
guidelines that determine how organs should be allocated among patients
who need a kidney, liver or other organ transplant.14 UNOS is a not-for-
8. See Council on Judicial & Ethical Affairs, supra note 5, at 34.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Thomas Bodenheimer, The Oregon Health Plan-Lessons for the Nation, 337 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 651, 651 (1997).
12. OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720 (2003).
13. Howard M. Leichter, Oregon's Bold Experiment: Whatever Happened to
Rationing?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 147, 149-50 (1999).
14. UNOS.org, Who We Are, http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/ (last visited Mar. 9,
2010).
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profit, membership organization of transplant programs and other interested
parties, and it issues policies to rank patients in terms of priority when
people die and their organs are donated for transplantation. 15 Thus, for
example, when a liver becomes available, the highest priority is given to
someone who lives in the local geographic area, who developed liver failure
recently and suddenly, and who is expected to die within seven days
without a transplant.
16
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) decides
whether drugs and other therapies are cost-effective enough to justify
coverage by the United Kingdom's universal health care system, the
National Health Service. 17 Established in 1999, NICE evaluates new and
existing treatments and calculates their cost per quality-adjusted-life-year
(QALY) 18 If the cost is not too high, NICE will recommend that the
treatment be covered by the National Health Service. 19 Very expensive
cancer drugs that extend life for only a few months may not receive a
recommendation from NICE.2"
There are several advantages to the centralized model:
1. The centralized model allows for a public, transparent process with
broad input from stakeholders. Rationing decisions can have profound
implications-indeed, they literally can mean the difference between life
and death. Because they have the potential for affecting people in a critical
way, it is important that everyone have a chance to participate in the
shaping of rationing policy.2' Without broad participation in a transparent
process, the legitimacy of rationing decisions can easily come under
question. If rationing decisions are made behind closed doors by a small
group of people or privately by individual physicians, those who must go
without medical care will wonder whether they were treated fairly.
2. The centralized model avoids a compromise of the duty of physicians
to their patients. In the view of many scholars, physicians have an essential,
15. DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 403 (2d ed. 2008).
16. Id. at 405, 407.
17. Robert Steinbrook, Saying No Isn't NICE-The Travails of Britain's National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1977, 1977 (2008).
18. Id. at 1979. The quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) is a metric that allows
policymakers to compare the effectiveness of different treatments. If a treatment provides an
additional year of life at full quality, it produces one QALY. If a treatment provides an
additional year of life at one-half quality, it produces one-half of a QALY. See David C.
Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and Public Policy, 21(3)
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 11, 13 (1991).
19. Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 1979-80 (reporting that NICE generally employs a cut-
off of $34,400 per QALY, with some willingness to approve more expensive therapies).
20. Id. at 1977.
21. See generally Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic
Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1617-34 (1992).
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professional obligation to advocate on behalf of their patients' needs
without taking into account the needs of other patients.22 Just as lawyers
vigorously advocate on behalf of their clients, doctors should vigorously
advocate on behalf of their patients.23 While rationing decisions must be
made, they are for society, not physicians, to make.
If physicians take on the role of rationer, it will undermine a key element
of the patient-physician relationship. Because of their vulnerability and lack
of expertise, patients must be able to trust in their physicians to look out for
their interests.24 Trust is the glue that binds doctor to patient. But if
physicians are simultaneously worrying about the interests of other patients,
25
real trust is no longer possible.
3. The centralized model promotes consistency and fairness across
different patients. If the responsibility for making rationing decisions is
divided among many institutions or individuals, different patients will be
treated differently depending on their particular decision maker.26 Consider,
for example, the situation in which physicians are responsible for making
rationing decisions on a case-by-case basis. When faced with the question
whether cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should be administered to a
terminally ill patient in the event of cardiac arrest, some doctors will view
CPR as unjustified given its low likelihood of meaningful benefit;27 others
will take the view that life has infinite value and should be preserved if at
all possible.28 But if treatment decisions vary from doctor to doctor, public
trust will be undermined. Patients will be much less willing to accept an
adverse rationing decision if they know that other patients like them are
treated more favorably by other physicians.
22. Robert M. Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Reallocation of Resources, 16 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 32, 38 (1986).
23. Id. at 38; Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1573,
1573-74 (1984).
24. David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 147 (1995) [hereinafter Health Care Reform].
25. See Daniel P. Sulmasy, Physicians, Cost Control, and Ethics, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 920, 922 (1992).
26. Id. at 921.
27. For most of these patients, CPR will not be successful in restoring a heartbeat, or
even if the patient is resuscitated, the patient may die within a short period of time while still
in the hospital. See Susan J. Diem et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on Television-
Miracles and Misinformation, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1578, 1579, 1581 (1996) (finding CPR
success rates from only a few percent to as high as thirty percent).
28. F. Tyrer et al., Factors that Influence Decisions About Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation: The Views of Doctors and Medical Students, 85 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 564,
566 (2009) (finding that physicians' personal beliefs and values influence their decisions
about CPR).
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III. THE DECENTRALIZED MODEL
Under this model, there is no attempt to create a single approach to
rationing. Rather, physicians and other health care providers are allowed to
make rationing decisions on a case-by-case basis. This is the "bedside"
approach to the rationing of health care. Proponents cite several arguments
in favor of this model:
1. Centralized decision making is not feasible for most decisions. In
theory, it might make sense to rely on a national commission to develop
rationing rules for physicians and hospitals to implement, but there are far
too many rationing decisions that doctors face for them to rely on formal
guidelines. As I have written previously:
There are literally thousands, if not millions, of different medical
decisions that must be made for patients. If someone suffers a head
injury, when should x- rays[, CT scans or MRI scans] be performed?...
If a person has chest pain, when should an EKG or [endoscopy] be
performed? When should patients with difficulty breathing be admitted
to the hospital? When should patients who have gallstones have their
gall bladder removed? ... Which patients should be in an intensive care
unit? If there is not room for everyone who needs intensive care in the
intensive care unit, who should have priority? Which patients with
coronary artery disease should undergo bypass surgery and which should
be treated with medication? How long should patients remain in the
hospital after delivering a baby, undergoing an appendectomy or
receiving a kidney transplant? To what extent should the guidelines take
into account individual variation from patient to patient? ... Even if
detailed guidelines could be developed, many of them would likely
become outdated by the time they were issued. Medical knowledge is
constantly evolving, so only reasonably general guidelines can account
for changes in information and technology... 29
Even in the Veterans Affairs health care system, where centralized
decision making plays a key role, there are more decisions that are left to
decentralized decision making than to centralized decision making.
30
2. Decentralized decision making responds to the "tragic choices"
problem. As discussed above,31 proponents of centralized decision making
cite its transparency as a virtue. The public will have input into the decision
29. David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to
Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 168-69 (1996).
30. See generally Steven M. Asch et al., Comparison of Quality of Care for Patients in
the Veterans Health Administration and Patients in a National Sample, 141 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 938, 938 (2004) (observing that the VA's practice guidelines cover a
"relatively narrow scope" of clinical practice).
31. See Fleck, supra, note 21.
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making process, and they will understand the rules by which rationing
decisions are made.
However, it is not clear that society can tolerate a transparent process for
rationing.32 According to Calabresi and Bobbitt, choosing which people
have priority when dealing with life-and-death decisions causes too much
social conflict. 33 As a result, public and transparent processes to make the
decisions ultimately break down.34 The history of dialysis for kidney failure
illustrates this thesis well. Dialysis once was rationed in this country, and
hospitals created committees to allocate the limited dialysis slots among
patients in need. 5 But the committees' choices were highly controversial,
and Congress responded by guaranteeing coverage under Medicare for any
person who needs dialysis.36
Because it is too difficult to establish rationing policies openly, society
employs subterfuges that try to hide the fact that rationing decisions are
being made. Thus, for example, when faced with the high cost of providing
care to a patient with a dismal prognosis, physicians might withhold care on
the ground that it would be "medically futile" to continue providing
treatment. By invoking medical futility, physicians can create the
impression that they are making their decision on the basis of objective,
scientific considerations rather than on the basis of non-medical value
37judgments about the appropriate allocation of scarce resources.
A number of efforts at rationing illustrate the tragic choices problem.
Consider, for example, the debate over comparative effectiveness research.
Policy experts observe that many health care dollars are spent inefficiently
because for many medical problems, we do not have sufficient data to tell
us which among different treatment options is the most effective. Studies
may tell us that several drugs are better than a placebo, but studies may not
tell us which of the drugs is the most effective. Accordingly, when
identifying key reforms for the U.S. health care system, experts see an
important role for research that compares the effectiveness of different
treatment options. 38 During the health care debates of 2009, however, many
people worried that comparative effectiveness research would be used to
deny care to patients on the basis that it was too expensive to provide the
32. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-18 (1978).
33. See generally id
34. Id. at 18-19.
35. DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 71 (2001).
36. Id. at 123-24; Roger W. Evans et al., Implications for Health Care Policy: A Social
and Demographic Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 JAMA 487,
487 (1981).
37. ORENTLICHER, supra note 35, at 158.
38. See Alvin 1. Mushlin & Hassan Ghomrawi, Heath Care Reform and the Need for
Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. e6(1), e6(1) (2010),
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/362/3/e6.pdf
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care.3 9 As a result, elected officials pledged to prevent such use of the
research.4°
The Oregon Health Plan's effort to ration health care is similarly
illuminating about the tragic choices problem. As mentioned, Oregon
decided that it would try to cover more of the poor with a basic level of
coverage rather than continue its practice of providing some of the poor a
more generous level of care. Under the plan, anyone with a family income
below the federal poverty level would be eligible for Medicaid.41 While the
state did undertake a public process to decide which treatments would be
covered and which treatments would not be covered, and while it published
its list of covered and uncovered treatments, it did not actually implement a
program that entailed meaningful rationing of care.42 In fact, the "basic"
plan it developed offered more generous services than typical private-sector
insurance policies.43
Decentralized decision making can overcome the tragic choices problem
by letting physicians make rationing decisions implicitly as they go about
their daily routine. When physicians face resource constraints, they adjust
to those limits and accommodate their treatment decisions to the
constraints. Thus, for example, physicians in the United States recommend
more procedures than physicians in England, with physicians in both
countries believing that they generally provide appropriate care.44 The U.S.
physicians believe that British physicians provide too little care, while the
British physicians believe that U.S. physicians provide too much care.45
Physicians appear to internalize their cost constraints when determining
standards of care, thereby allowing themselves to shape their practices in
terms of the resources available to them.46 This adjustment of practice to
resources need not jeopardize the quality of care. As discussed below, when
physicians face reasonable resource constraints, they can accommodate to
those limits without compromising patient welfare.
39. Barry Meier, New Effort Reopens a Medical Minefield, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at
B1.
40. See, Mushlin & Ghomrawi, supra note 38, at e6(1) (describing prohibitions in both
House and Senate bills against the use of comparative-effectiveness research results in
making coverage decisions).
41. Lawrence Jacobs et al., The Oregon Health Plan and the Political Paradox of
Rationing: What Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon Did, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 161, 163 (1999).
42. Id at 162, 165.
43. Id. at 167.
44. HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING
HOSPITAL CARE 37, 48-49, 59, 64, 100-02 (1984). To be sure, British physicians also
acknowledge that resource constraints limit the care they provide at times. Id. at 37, 67.
45. Id. at 66.
46. Id. at 36, 111,127.
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3. Decentralized decision making allows for individualized decision
making. Centrally-determined rationing guidelines may work for most
patients, but they will provide a poor fit for other patients. Patients can be
different in important ways, and people rightly worry that a rationing
guideline may not work well for everyone. Consider in this regard the
failure of an important guideline for the treatment of diabetes. In 2006, the
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) adopted a standard
calling for the aggressive control of blood sugar.47 Data suggested that tight
control would reduce the chances of long-term complications of diabetes,
including heart disease, kidney failure, and loss of vision.48 Two years later,
the NCQA withdrew the standard after data demonstrated that the new
standard caused significant harm to some patients.49
4. Decentralized decision making preserves a more traditional, more
comfortable role for physicians. As discussed above, the centralized model
for rationing rests on a view that physicians should assume the lawyer-like
role of patient advocate, zealously promoting the interests of their own
patients and letting others decide how health care should be allocated
among different patients when limits on society's resources mean that only
some of the patients can be served.
Yet, as William Sage has observed, physicians do not see themselves as
lawyer-like advocates. Rather, they think of themselves as judge-like
decision makers.5° Physicians regularly have to balance the needs of their
patients with the limits of their society's resources, and they see this as an
appropriate part of their professional responsibility.5 ' Moreover, writes
Sage, the physician as zealous advocate may not be the kind of doctor that
patients want. Patients rely on their physicians to provide them with honest,
authoritative advice, not to make one-sided, often exaggerated arguments
for one particular course of action. 2
IV. CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF STRUCTURE; DECENTRALIZED
DECISIONMAKING
As the discussion of the two models indicates, both have their virtues;
both have their drawbacks. In the end, though, it simply is not feasible to
pursue a centralized approach to rationing. Practice guidelines are
important, but medical decisions are too many, too varied, and too nuanced
47. Barry Meier, Diabetes Case Shows Pitfalls of Treatment Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2009, at B 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1529, 1578 (1999).
51. Id. at 1578.
52. Seeid. at 1616.
2010]
Annals of Health Law
to be reduced to formulas that can guide physician decision-making at the
bedside.
That said, there is an important role for centralized planning. Even if a
national agency cannot provide comprehensive standard policies, a national
policy can provide a standard structure that will foster appropriate rationing
decisions at the bedside. In other words, we will need to rely on
individualized decisions by physicians, but we also will need to channel the
rationing decisions of physician in the right direction by implementing
nationwide changes in the structure of our health care system. Currently,
physicians practice under a fee-for-service system of compensation that
rewards the provision of more care rather than better care, and in a health
care system with substantial capacity that allows for generous levels of care.
There is plenty of opportunity to provide too much care, and insurers will
compensate physicians for doing so. Accordingly, the system's structure
invites practice patterns of excessive treatment. Rationing policy is thus
forced to push back against strong currents favoring increased spending.
Rather than trying to swim upstream, it is better to change the current's
direction. Appropriate limits on health care spending can be realized by
restructuring the health care system in a way that invites cost-effective care.
The idea here is analogous to the "invisible hand" of the free market. As
the experience in the U.S.S.R. and other centrally-planned economies
illustrate, governments or commissions fail when they try to determine
which goods to produce and how many to produce. But governments can
structure the market with antitrust rules, securities regulations and other
policies to channel economic decisions in a productive direction. Similarly,
government can structure the health care system with policies to channel
rationing decisions in a cost-effective direction. Perhaps the most important
policies include the adoption of resource constraints and the implementation
of compensation methods that do not encourage excessive care.
V. POLICIES FOR COST-EFFECTIVE CARE
Adopting real resource constraints. Because most patients carry health
care insurance to pay the bulk of their medical expenses, patients and
doctors are insufficiently sensitive to the costs of care. As long as patients
pay only a small portion of the costs of their care, they will want more care
than is socially desirable.53 And as long as physicians are paid more for
doing more, they will offer more care than is socially desirable.54
It is thus an axiom of American medicine that supply creates its own
demand. The greater the number of hospital beds available in a community,
53. Brock, supra note 3, at 134.
54. Id.
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for example, the more likely it is that people will be admitted for hospital
care. 55 Similarly, people are more likely to die in a hospital in communities
with greater hospital capacity.56 However, the increased use of hospital care
does not confer any medical benefit: death rates are the same in
communities with lower and higher hospital capacity.
57
High use of hospital care may not confer any health benefit, but it does
come at considerable cost. It is far more expensive to take care of patients
by admitting them to the hospital than by providing outpatient care in a
physician's office. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that many
unnecessary procedures, especially cardiovascular surgeries, are performed
in this country.58 Ideally, hospital care would be reserved for patients who
truly need to be in the hospital for surgical intervention or other medical
care.
One could try to reduce inappropriate admissions by developing practice
guidelines or by having insurers implement pre-admission screening. But
those approaches have not been very effective.59 On the other hand, studies
suggest that more appropriate utilization of hospitals can be achieved
simply by reducing the number of hospital beds. As indicated, when there is
more room for inpatients in a community, physicians admit more patients to
the hospital; conversely, when hospital capacity shrinks, physicians admit
fewer patients to the hospital. Importantly, the lower levels of inpatient care
do not appear to result in any harm to patient health.60 Rather, with the
smaller capacity, physicians adjust their practice patterns and do a better job
of reserving hospital care for patients who really need it. In Richmond,
Virginia, for example, hospital capacity per capita shrunk by more than
one-third between 1996 and 2009, yet the metropolitan area developed into
a community providing relatively high-quality, low-cost care. 61 The
55. Elliott S. Fisher et al., Associations Among Hospital Capacity, Utilization, and
Morality of U.S. Medicare Beneficiaries, Controlling for Sociodemographic Factors, 34
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1351, 1356 (2000).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1358.
58. See Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care Quality, Geographic
Variations, and the Challenge of Supply-Sensitive Care, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 69, 72
(2003); See also CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
HEALTH CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 13 (2007),
digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1316&context-key workplace
(reporting that the rate for coronary artery bypass surgery and other revascularization
procedures for patients with coronary artery disease is seventy-seven percent higher in the
United States than the average for economically-advanced democracies, and sixty-four
percent higher than Germany, the country with the second-highest rate of revascularization
procedures).
59. Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 179-86.
60. Id.
61. David Leonhardt, Health Cuts with Little Effect on Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009,
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Veterans Affairs health care system also evolved into a higher-quality,
lower-cost system as it was reducing its hospital capacity.62
The ability of doctors to make appropriate adjustments in their practice
patterns when capacity shrinks applies not only to the number of
hospitalizations but also to the level of care once patients are admitted to
the hospital. In a study of intensive care utilization, researchers found that
decreasing an intensive care unit's capacity by almost half led to fewer
patients being admitted to intensive care and more patients being treated in
regular hospital units.63 Nevertheless, there was no increase in patient
deaths or other serious consequences. 64 Notably, the hospital did not issue
any guidelines for its physicians to help them decide which patients would
have priority for intensive care.65 Physicians simply recognized that they
had to use a higher threshold for admission to the intensive care unit, and
they did so without any worsening of patient outcomes.
These results are not surprising. They are consistent with an international
study in which researchers compared the efficiency of different countries'
health care systems.66 That is, the researchers identified the level of health
for each country that would exist in the absence of any health care spending
(the minimum level of health) and the maximum level of health that could
be achieved with the country's health care resources. 67 They then measured
how much of the potential improvement in health quality was actually being
achieved in the countries and how much the countries were spending on
health care.68 From these data, the researchers could calculate a ratio of
health improvement to health care spending. Countries with higher ratios
were higher-efficiency countries, and countries with lower ratios were
lower-efficiency countries. 69 The United States ranked among the top-third
of countries worldwide, but behind most of the Western European
countries, Australia, Canada, and Japan.v° We clearly do not get the biggest
bang for our health care bucks; with a more efficient system, we could
spend less and achieve the same outcomes in terms of improving or
at B1.
62. Jonathan B. Perlin et al., The Veterans Health Administration: Quality, Value,
Accountability, and Information as Transforming Strategies for Patient-Centered Care, 10
AM. J. MANAGED CARE 828, 828-30 (2004).
63. Daniel E. Singer et al., Rationing Intensive Care-Physician Responses to a
Resource Shortage, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1155, 1156 (1983).
64. Id. at 1159.
65. Id. at 1158.
66. David B. Evans et al., Comparative Efficiency of National Health Systems: Cross
National Econometric Analysis, 323 BRIT. MED. J. 307, 307 (2001).
67. Id. at 307-08.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 308.
70. Id. at 309.
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maintaining people's health.
It would not be sufficient to limit only the number of hospital beds. Other
resources need to be capped as well. Surgeons can perform many operations
in outpatient clinics, and physicians can overspend on unnecessary
diagnostic tests and procedures. Accordingly, it would be important to
restrict the number of outpatient surgical suites, the number of MRI
scanners and the number of other health care facilities.
Salary or capitation-based compensation. When physicians are paid
more to do more, they will do more. Fee-for-service compensation
encourages the provision of more services. Thus, for example, when a walk-
in medical clinic switched from a fixed salary to paying physicians a
percentage of the revenues generated by the blood tests and radiologic
studies ordered by the physicians, the physicians ordered more blood tests
and x-rays.71 When physicians are paid a salary or a fixed fee per patient
(capitation), they no longer have a financial incentive to perform more
procedures. If all physicians were compensated by salary or capitation,
physicians would be less likely to recommend surgery for patients who do
not really need an operation, and fewer surgeries and other procedures
would be performed.
There are other ways to restructure physician compensation to generate
more prudent use of health care dollars. If the compensation gap between
surgeons and non-surgeons were narrowed, fewer doctors would enter
surgical fields and more doctors would become internists and pediatricians.
Patients would spend more time with doctors who prefer to treat illness
with medication and less time with doctors who prefer to treat illness with
more expensive surgical procedures.
Fee-for-service compensation not only encourages the provision of
unnecessary care; it also discourages the provision of high-quality, low-cost
care. Hospitals that have implemented effective programs to promote early
intervention and greater preventive care find that their revenues drop, often
to the point that they lose money while providing higher-quality, lower-cost
care. 72 In a system in which physicians are paid salaries and hospitals
receive fixed budgets, health care providers will profit from the high-
quality, low-cost care that now is a financial loser.
For salary and capitation to replace fee-for-service compensation,
71. David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to Financial Incentives. Evidence
from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1059, 1060 (1990).
72. Ian Urbina, In the Treatment of Diabetes, Success Often Does Not Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2006, at Al (reporting on diabetes centers that focused on preventive care but were
forced to close because reimbursement rates were too low); David Leonhardt, Dr. James
Will Make It Better, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 8, 2009, at 46 (describing how a hospital lost
$329,000 when it improved the quality and lowered the cost of its care for premature
babies).
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physicians need to become part of health care organizations that either can
employ them on a salaried basis or can take on the size needed to assume
the risk of capitated payments.73 Thus, many experts advocate the
development of "accountable care organizations" to promote higher-quality,
lower-cost care. 74 That is, rather than practicing alone or in small, specialty
groups, physicians would join large, multi-specialty groups. These
accountable care organizations not only facilitate the switch from fee-for-
service medicine to salary or capitation, 75 they also provide other
advantages for patient care. Instead of different physicians individually
assuming responsibility for only a small part of a patient's care, the
organization would assume full responsibility for the patient's care. In this
model, patient care is improved and costs are lowered in part because it is
easier to implement capacity constraints and eliminate fee-for-service
compensation when physicians work in large groups.76 In addition, the
larger, integrated organizations have the ability to coordinate patient care
more effectively and to invest in information technology, the development
of patient management protocols, and other initiatives that can yield more
77cost-effective care.
VI. LESS DESIRABLE POLICIES FOR COST-EFFECTIVE CARE
A number of writers have suggested other strategies to encourage cost-
effective care. In this section, I will discuss two of these alternatives and
explain why I do not think they are very useful.
Financial incentives for patients. As mentioned above, patients who
carry health care insurance will want health care even when its benefits are
not sufficient to justify the costs of the care. If, for an example an MRI scan
costs $1,000 and the patient only has to pay $100 of the cost, the patient
73. Health Care Reform, supra note 24, at 159-60, 195. Capitated payments can be used
just to cover the physician's own services, but physicians might still overspend on diagnostic
tests and referrals to specialists. To ensure that physicians are sufficiently cost-conscious, a
health care system could pay global capitation fees to physicians and hospitals to cover all
the costs of their patients' care. When global capitation fees are used, it is important for
health care providers to assume responsibility for a substantial patient population. There
always will be a small number of patients with very high medical costs. As long as the
providers of care can spread those costs over a large patient base, capitation fees are feasible.
But if providers had a small patient population, a few very expensive patients could drive the
practice into bankruptcy.
74. See Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended
Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS w44, w44 (2007).
75. Leorlhardt, supra note 72, at 33. When health care experts cite model health care
systems in the United States, like the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic or Intermountain
Health Care, they typically point to health care organizations that pay their physicians a
salary.
76. Fisher et al., supra note 74, at w44, w53.
77. Id. at w53.
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will want the scan as long as the total benefit of the scan (in economic
terms) is more than $100. But from a societal standpoint, it would not make
sense to perform the scan unless the total benefit is more than $1,000.
To counteract the tendency of patients to desire too much care, some
experts believe that health care insurers should adopt greater incentives for
patients to become more cost-conscious of their care. Thus, for example,
employers are offering health care plans with "health savings accounts."
Under these plans, the employer or employee funds the employee's health
savings account with between one thousand and twenty-five hundred
dollars, and the employee uses the account to pay the first thousand or
twenty-five hundred dollars in health care bills.78 Because employees retain
the unspent dollars for future use, they have an incentive to be more cost-
conscious when seeking health care.
When individuals bear a greater responsibility for the costs of their care,
they are less likely to seek care, and consequently, health care costs are
reduced. 79 However, there are two key concerns with financial incentives
for patients. First, when patients reduce their demand for medical care
because of its costs, they do not just reduce their demand for unnecessary
care. They also may reduce their demand for important care.80 Non-
physicians are not well-equipped to distinguish between essential and
optional care. Second, when patients face major surgeries or other very
expensive care, the financial incentives of health savings accounts will not
be relevant. Whether a hospital would charge fifteen thousand dollars or
twenty-five thousand dollars, the individual's health savings account will be
fully emptied.8'
Globally negotiated fees for health care providers. In this approach, fee-
for-service compensation is retained, but insurers or the government
negotiates standard fees for physicians and hospitals. With some variation
based on geographic area, all physicians and hospitals are paid the same
amount for each service. Other countries, including Germany and Japan,
use this approach, and citizens of those countries enjoy lower prices for
health care services than do U.S. citizens.8 2
78. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL: MOVING
BEYOND THE EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH-INSURANCE SYSTEM 24 (2007), http://www.ced.org/
images/library/reports/health-care/report-healthcare07.pdf.
79. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence
About Effects on Cost and Quality, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS, w516, w523 (2006).
80. Id.; Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 188.
81. COMM. FOR EcoN. DEV., supra note 78, at 15, 25.
82. Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Systemwide Cost Control-The Missing Link
in Health Care Reform, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1132 (2009). In the view of some
experts, higher prices for health care services are the main reason why health care costs are
higher in the United States than in other countries. See also Gerard Anderson et al., It's the
Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH
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The problem with this approach is that lowering fees encourages
physicians to maintain their income by increasing the volume of the
services they provide. For instance, patients in Japan, where fees are tightly
controlled, visit a physician 3.5 times as often, spend 3.6 times more days in
the hospital for each admission, and have access to nearly 3 times as many
CT scanners as do patients in the U.S.83 Real health care reform entails cost
containment, but it also entails appropriate levels of care. We need changes
in the U.S. health care system that will address both cost and quality;
globally-negotiated fees only target the cost side of the equation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because it is not feasible to develop formal rationing guidelines for
physicians to implement, the rationing of health care must be left largely to
physicians as they make treatment decisions for their patients. But even if
physicians cannot be guided by formal standards, their decision making can
be channeled in the direction of more cost-effective care by limiting the
resources at their disposal and eliminating their personal incentive to
provide high-cost care. The invisible hand of a properly-structured health
care market can generate the kind of cost-effective care that is needed in
this country.
AFFAIRS 89, 89 (2003); PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 58, at 16.
83. PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 58, at 7, 9, 15.
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